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ern European member
states exiting the eurozone
While Greece defaulting on its sovereign debt and leaving
the European Monetary Union would in and of itself have a
relatively minor effect on the world economy, such a move
could, however, undermine investor confidence in the Por-
tuguese, Spanish and Italian capital markets and thus pro-
voke not only a sovereign default in those states as well, but
also a severe worldwide recession. This would in turn reduce
economic growth by a total of 17.2 trillion euros in the
world’s 42 largest economies in the lead-up to 2020. Hence
it is incumbent upon the community of nations to prevent
Greece from a sovereign default as well as leaving the euro,
and the domino effect that this event could induce.
Focus Legend for the scenarios: Grexit: Greece defaults and leaves
the eurozone
 GP-Exit: Both Greece and Portugal
default and leave the eurozone
 GPS-Exit: Portugal, Greece and
Spain default and leave the euro-
zone.
 GPSI-Exit: Greece, Portugal, Spain
and Italy default and leave the eu-
rozone.
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might leave the European Monetary Union
has become increasingly strident since the
onset of the euro crisis in September
2009. For example, in July 2012 German
Minister of Economics Philipp Rösler ex-
pressed the view that the prospect of
Greece leaving the European Monetary
Union was no longer so daunting as it had
once seemed. CSU Secretary General
Alexander Dobrindt echoed this view in
late August 2012, when he predicted that
Greece would leave the eurozone by 2013.
The European Central Bank’s decision this
past September to buy up government
bonds of European Monetary Union mem-
ber states that are facing a sovereign debt
crisis somewhat eased the situation for
these states. However, their budgets are
still in disarray, a fact underscored by the
statement by Greek Prime Minister An-
tonis Samaras in October 2012 to the ef-
fect that Greece will be bankrupt by the
end of next month unless further infu-
sions of foreign capital are forthcoming.
Against this backdrop, it is important to
bear in mind that there is no legal mecha-
nism for excluding European Monetary
Union members from the eurozone. How-
ever, bailout money might simply dry up
because the actors providing it may ulti-
mately take the view that budget cutbacks
in the eurozone member states facing
budgetary crises are not progressing satis-
factorily. Without bailout money from
European rescue packages and the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF), these
states would have no further revenue and
would face bankruptcy. But in order for a
state that finds itself in this plight to be
able to pay government employees and
finance pension payments and other enti-
tlements, it would need to introduce its
own currency: in other words, it would
have no choice but to leave the European
Monetary Union. We will now discuss the
consequences of such an event, in terms
of four possible exit scenarios.
1.Design of the exit sce-
narios
Our projections concerning the economic
consequences of the four European Mone-
tary Union member states that are cur-
rently in dire financial straits leaving the
eurozone are based on four scenarios. In
the first, only Greece takes leave of the eu-
rozone (Grexit scenario). In the second,
both Greece and Portugal exit (GP-Exit
scenario). The third scenario sees the de-
parture of Spain, in addition to Greece and
Portugal (GPS-Exit scenario), and in the
fourth scenario the quartet of states com-
prising Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain
bids adieu to the euro. We opted for this
eurozone exiting sequence because the
current debate is largely couched in terms
of states that might leave the monetary
union.
We estimated the real economy-
consequences entailed by these four sce-
narios by carrying out simulations using
the Prognos macroeconomic world model
called VIEW (see box). To this end, we
modelled the projected real GDP of the 42
states in the VIEW model from 2013 to
2020, based on the assumption that our
putative scenarios will become reality
next year. The computations concerning
real GDP resulting from these scenarios
were compared with the economic data
and forecasts in Prognos’s “Weltreport
2012,” which was published in mid 2012
and is predicated on the assumption that
the eurozone will remain intact (baseline
scenario). The forecasts presented in this
report were likewise elaborated using our
VIEW model. According to the report, the
budget cutbacks that need to be made in
the lead-up to 2016 and 2017 will be a
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The VIEW model is a macroeconomic model that is used
to make projections and simulate economic scenarios. The
simulations in our study encompassed the world’s 42
states that account for more than 90 percent of the world
economy and were based on the following parameters:
supply and demand; labour markets; government fi-
nances; as well as exports, imports, currency rates and so
on. Thus, the model also factors in the interrelationships
between the various states as regards these parameters.
huge drag on worldwide economic growth
(see Prognos AG 2012). Our four scenarios
forecast even greater growth slowdowns.
The four simulations we carried out were
based on the following assumptions: It
was presumed that Greek bailouts would
be suspended, causing Greece to face sov-
ereign default and consequently introduce
its own currency. No one can possibly
predict how large this haircut would actu-
ally be, but our simulations are based on a
scenario involving a 60 percent default
rate. The remaining 40 percent of Greece’s
debt would continue to be
denominated in euros.
This haircut would affect
both public and private
creditors, who would be
forced to take a charge on
60 percent of their loans
to Greece. Table 1 dis-
plays how this might play
out financially for selected
states.
A Greek sovereign default would also re-
sult in correspondingly high writedowns
for government budgets. As such write-
downs are of an accounting nature, the
budget deficits of the states to which
Greece owes money either directly or indi-
rectly would increase, thus driving up the
sovereign debt and debt service of these
states. This in turn would force the gov-
ernments affected to consolidate else-
where by either cutting their expenditures
or raising taxes. Such measures reduce
demand for goods and services, which in
turn reduces economic output and in-
creases unemployment. The VIEW model
takes into account the budgetary impact of
a haircut by positing writedowns of the
various industrial nations’ extensive loan
receivables and liabilities (EFSM, EFSF
and IMF bailouts; the European Central
Bank buying up government bonds; target
loans). The budgetary impact of sovereign
defaults cannot be taken into account for
emerging economies owing to a lack of
data.
Greece’s public and private sector debtors
would also need to write off 60 percent of
their outstanding loans. According to our
calculations, these losses would presuma-
bly have a direct negative wealth effect on
household income for the relevant year;
and this in turn would reduce housing
start-ups and consumer spending.
Sovereign default and the introduction of a
national currency would of course have far
reaching economic consequences also for
Greece. The new Greek currency would be
devalued relative to all other currencies,
and the scope of this devaluation remains
every bit as uncertain as the scope of a
haircut. Our VIEW model simulations are
predicated on a 50 percent devaluation of
the Greek currency. This devaluation
would drive up the government-debt ratio
as expressed in the new Greek currency,
because this debt would have previously
been denominated in euros. Hence intro-
duction of a national currency would re-
duce Greece’s government debt ratio by a
mere 20 percent; and what’s worse, capi-
tal-market confidence in Greece’s credit-
worthiness would evaporate. Hence the
Greek government’s sole source of reve-
nue would be tax revenue, which in turn
means that the Greek budget balance
would be virtually zero in the lead-up to
2020. A Greek sovereign default and
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vestor confidence, which our simulations
(based on past examples such as Argen-
tina in 2001) show would translate into a
ten percent decline in 2013 and a five
percent decline in 2014, for both parame-
ters. Moreover, the aforementioned de-
clines in demand for goods and services
would not be limited to the state affected.
In a world where individual state econo-
mies maintain highly symbiotic relation-
ships with each other through foreign
trade, falls in consumer demand in one
state would soon spread to its trading
partners. The result would be a worldwide
decline in economic activity.
The other three scenar-
ios were simulated
based on the same as-
sumption of a 60 per-
cent haircut and a 50
percent devaluation of
the new currency rela-
tive to all other curren-
cies.
2.Ramifications of the eu-
rozone exit scenarios for
the world economy
The VIEW model simulations discussed in
this section shed light on the likely eco-
nomic effects of the four eurozone exit
scenarios for the 42 states encompassed
by the model. Like all simulations, the re-
sults we obtained were strongly influ-
enced by the assumptions on which they
were based, and in this case above all by
the actual scope of the haircuts and the
currency devaluations that would come
into play. In our view, the assumptions
that form the basis for our simulations
currently represent the closest approxima-
tion of the reality that would actually un-
fold.
Using these assumptions as basis, the im-
pact of the four scenarios on the world
economy was simulated for the period ex-
tending from 2013 to 2020. In the interest
of modelling the impact of each of the four
scenarios on economic growth, annual de-
clines in GDP were computed in compari-
son to the projections in Prognos’s “Wel-
treport 2012” and were then tallied for the
years 2013 to 2020. The projected cumu-
lative declines in economic growth thus
obtained are displayed in table 2 for all
four scenarios.
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Greece and its consequent
exit from the European
Monetary Union would, in
and of itself, have only a
minor impact on economic
growth in Europe and the
rest of the world. The ag-
gregate GDP decline for
2013 to 2020 in the 42
VIEW states, which account
for more than 90 percent of
worldwide output, would
amount to 674 billion euros.
The decline in Greece’s
GDP would be the single
largest chunk in this regard
(164 billion euros). The cu-
mulative decline in growth
in Germany would amount
to only 73 billion euros. In
the interest of putting these
GDP declines into perspec-
tive for each of the various
states, the cumulative de-
cline in economic growth
was compared to GDP for
2013. Greece’s cumulative
GDP decline would amount
to 94 percent for 2013,
compared to only 2.9 and
0.9 percent for Germany
and the US respectively.
The economies of France,
Portugal, and Bulgaria
would be relatively hard hit,
by virtue of a cumulative
GDP decline amounting to
around 8 percent.
GP-Exit scenario: The eco-
nomic impact of both
Greece and Portugal leaving
the European Monetary Un-
ion would be palpable, but
still relatively minor. In this
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/06 scenario, the cumulative GDP decline inthe 42 VIEW states would amount to
nearly 2.4 trillion euros, with Portugal ac-
counting for 84 billion of this amount
alone. In Germany, the 225 billion euro
decline in GDP under the GP-Exit scenario
would wreak substantial economic dam-
age. The 365 billion decline in GDP would
be even greater in the US (in absolute
terms) than in Europe, while the figures
for France and China would be 331 and
275 billion euros respectively. However,
these figures are put into perspective
when compared to the declines in GDP for
2013. The cumulative GDP declines in the
US and Germany would amount to 3.3 and
9.1 percent of 2013 GDP respectively,
while the figure for France would be ap-
preciably higher (17.6 percent). But by
comparison, the 55 percent decline in Por-
tugal would be far more severe. The figure
for Greece is only slightly higher than for
the Grexit scenario and would remain at
around 94 percent.
GPS-Exit scenario: Greece, Portugal and
Spain leaving the European Monetary Un-
ion would provoke palpable GDP declines
worldwide. The cumulative decline in
France’s GDP in the lead-up to 2020
would amount to more than 1.2 trillion eu-
ros, and in Germany to more than 850 bil-
lion euros. The cumulative GDP declines
for the four BRIC states would amount to
1.4 trillion euros, and for the US to more
than 1.2 trillion euros. The total economic
losses in the 42 VIEW states would
amount to nearly 7.9 trillion euros. In the
GPS-Exit scenario, cumulative GDP losses
for 2013 would be considerable, particu-
larly in Portugal (due to the fact that
France is a major trading partner) and
France (due to, among other things, the
extensive loans French banks have made
to Spain). In this scenario, Portugal’s GDP
would decrease by 104 percent relative to
2013, followed by Greece (96 percent),
Spain (81 percent), France (65 percent),
Germany (34 percent), China (24 percent)
and the US (11 percent).
GPSI-Exit scenario: The departure of
Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain from the
European Monetary Union would provoke
a worldwide recession that would trans-
late into a GDP decline amounting to
nearly 17.2 trillion euros in the 42 VIEW
states in the lead-up to 2020. In terms of
absolute figures, the declines would be the
greatest in France (2.9 trillion euros), the
US (2.8 trillion euros), China (1.9 trillion
euros), and Germany (around 1.7 trillion
euros). France would be particularly hard
hit by Italy’s sovereign default and exit
from the euro, on account of the extensive
loans French banks have made to Italy.
The cumulative GDP decline would
amount to 154 percent of economic output
for 2013, with Italy alone registering a
cumulative GDP loss of around 75 percent
of GDP for 2013. The counterpart figures
for Germany, the US and China would be
69, 25 and 49 percent respectively.
A decline in real GDP of this magnitude
would also drive up unemployment. For
example, in the GPSI-Exit scenario Ger-
many’s unemployment rate in 2015 and
2016 would be 2.5 and 2.2 percent higher,
respectively, relative to the baseline sce-
nario. In the ensuing 2017 to 2020 period,
Germany’s unemployment rate would
range from 0.5 to 1.7 percent higher than
the baseline scenario.
3.Economic policy
consequences
While Greece defaulting on its sovereign
debt and leaving the European Monetary
Union would in and of itself have a rela-
tively minor effect on the world economy,
the consequences of this event are to all
intents and purpose shrouded in mystery.
07
Fu
tu
re 
So
cia
l M
ark
et 
Ec
on
om
yP
oli
cy 
Br
ief
 # 
20
12
/06One possible consequence, however, isthat Greece leaving the European Mone-
tary Union would send a robust and last-
ing signal to Italy, Portugal and Spain that
the gravy train of bailouts is bound to end
unless these states make enormous efforts
to get their financial houses in order. This
in turn might potentially reduce opposi-
tion to tough but necessary reforms, and
thus help resolve the euro crisis. But on
the other hand, a Greek sovereign default
could lead to capital market speculation
and other untoward responses that would
provoke sovereign default on the part of
Portugal, Spain and ultimately Italy. And
this in turn would send the world econ-
omy into a deep recession that would af-
fect not only Europe, but the rest of the
world as well. Apart from the severe eco-
nomic consequences of such a recession,
it would also put major strains on the so-
cial fabric and political stability of a num-
ber of states, particularly those that leave
the European Monetary Union; but other
states would feel these strains as well.
Hence there is a definite possibility that
Greece leaving the European Monetary
Union would provoke a domino effect that
would translate into a lengthy worldwide
recession.
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/06 Policy Brief 2012/04: A Modern Social Market EconomyThe new MSME Index defines and measures the features of
a Modern Social Market Economy in international compari-
son. In contrast to other indices that measure economic per-
formance, the MSME Index takes an institutional approach,
outlining a system of essential institutions and measurable
indicators for the construction and assessment of modern
social market economies. Among other insights, the index
could guide the European Union toward achieving the
“highly competitive social market economy” that it defines
in the Lisbon Treaty as its desired economic order.
Policy Brief 2012/05: Maastricht 2.0
The European Union’s regulations governing sovereign debt
are based on the principle of equal treatment of all member
states. The recommendations we make here concerning
changes in EU sovereign-debt reduction rules take account
of national particularities. According to our calculations,
such reformed regulations would do far more to promote
economic growth than would be the case under the Fiscal
Compact’s European debt brake. By 2030, real gains in
growth will amount to more than 450 billion euros.
Bertelsmann Stiftung
Carl-Bertelsmann-Straße 256
D-33311 Gütersloh
www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de
Dr. Thieß Petersen
Phone: +49 5241 81-81218
thiess.petersen@bertelsmann-stiftung.de
Eric Thode
Phone: +49 5241 81-81581
eric.thode@bertelsmann-stiftung.de
ISSN-Nummer: 2191-2467
Upcoming releases:
• Laura Naegele, Claire Dhéret and Eric
Thode: Better Employment Opportunities
for Older Workers
